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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-NEW YORK STATUTE
PROSCRIBING DISTRIBUTION OF NONOBSCENE MATERIALS DEPICTING
MINORS ENGAGED IN SEXUAL CONDUCT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FIRST
AMENDMENT BECAUSE THE MATERIALS ARE OUTSIDE FIRST
AMENDMENT PROTECTION AND THE STATUTE IS NOT SUBSTANTIALLY
OVERBROAD
New York v. Ferber (U.S. 1982)
In March 1978, Paul Ferber, the proprietor of a Manhattan bookstore
which specialized in sexually oriented products, sold two films1 depicting
young boys engaged in sexual conduct.2 Ferber was indicted under the New
York Penal Laws 3 on two counts of promoting an obscene sexual perform-
ance by a child 4 and two counts of promoting a sexual performance by a
child 5 in violation of the New York Penal Laws. A jury found him guilty of
1. New York v. Ferber, 102 S. Ct. 3348, 3352 (1982).
2. Id. Ferber made two separate sales to an undercover agent, one on March 5,
1978, and the second on March 7, 1978. New York v. Ferber, 96 Misc. 2d 669, 671,
409 N.Y.S.2d 632, 634 (Sup. Ct. 1978), af'd, 74 A.D.2d 558, 424 N.Y.S.2d 967 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1980), rev'd, 52 N.Y.2d 674, 422 N.E.2d 523, 439 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1981), rev'd
and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 3348 (1982). The films were each 10 minutes in duration.
One depicted a boy masturbating, the other showed a group of boys engaged in
sexual conduct. 96 Misc. 2d at 677, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
3. 102 S. Ct. at 3352. Ferber was indicted under § 263 of the New York Penal
Law, enacted in 1977. The legislature had declared its intentions with respect to
§ 263 as follows:
The legislature finds that there has been a proliferation of exploitation of
children as subjects in sexual performances. The care of children is a sacred
trust and should not be abused by those who seek to profit through a com-
mercial network based upon the exploitation of children. The public policy
of the state demands the protection of children from exploitation through
sexual performances.
The legislature further finds that the sale of these movies, magazines
and photographs depicting the sexual conduct of children to be so abhor-
rent to the fabric of our society that it urges law enforcement officers to
aggressively seek out and prosecute both the peddlers of children and the
promoters of this filth by vigorously applying the sanctions contained in this
act.
Sexual Performances by Children, ch. 910, § 1, 1977 N.Y. Laws 1901.
4. 102 S. Ct. at 3352. Ferber was charged with two violations of § 263.10 of the
New York Penal Laws. This section states, "A person is guilty of promoting an ob,
scene sexual performance by a child when, knowing the character and content
thereof, he produces, directs or promotes any obscene performance which includes sex-
ual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age." N.Y. Penal Law § 263.10
(McKinney 1980).
5. 102 S. Ct. at 3352. Ferber was charged with two violations of§ 263.15 of the
New York Penal Laws. This section states, "A person is guilty of promoting a sexual
performance by a child when, knowing the character and content thereof, he pro-
duces, directs or promotes any performance which includes sexual conduct by a child
less than sixteen years of age." N.Y. Penal Law § 263.15 (McKinney 1980). Section
(416)
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the latter two counts. 6 His convictions were affirmed without opinion by the
Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court. 7 The New York
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the New York statute violated the
first amendment because it was overbroad in that it prohibited promotion of
materials not legally obscene, and thus impermissibly interfered with free
speech. 8 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded,9 holding that the New York statute did not violate the first amend-
ment because the materials involved were outside the scope of first
amendment protection and the statute was not substantially overbroad. New
York v. Ferber, 102 S. Ct. 3348 (1982).
Freedom of speech under the first amendment 1 ° has been called the
most majestic guarantee under the Constitution. 1 This guarantee is appli-
263 also provides definitions of terms used therein. A "sexual performance" is de-
fined as "any performance or part thereof which includes sexual conduct by a child
less than sixteen years of age." Id. § 263.00(1). "Sexual conduct" is defined as "ac-
tual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality,
masturbation, sado-masochistic abuse, or lewd exhibition of the genitals." Id.
§ 263.00(3). The statute defines "performance" as "any play, motion picture, photo-
graph or dance" or "any other visual representation exhibited before an audience."
Id. § 263.00(4) (McKinney 1980). To "promote" is defined as "to procure, manufac-
ture, issue, sell, give, provide, lend, mail, deliver, transfer, transmute, publish, dis-
tribute, circulate, disseminate, present, exhibit or advertise, or to offer or agree to do
the same." Id. § 263.00(5) (McKinney 1980).
6. 102 S. Ct. at 3352. Ferber was sentenced to 45 days in prison. Id. at 3351 n.3.
He was acquitted of the two counts of promoting an obscene sexual performance,
under § 263.10. Id. at 3352.
7. 74 A.D.2d 558, 424 N.Y.S.2d 967 (1980).
8. 52 N.Y.2d 674, 422 N.E.2d 523, 439 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1981). The Court of Ap-
peals reasoned that § 263.15 could not be construed to include an obscenity standard
and thus "the statute would... prohibit the promotion of materials which are tradi-
tionally entitled to constitutional protection from government interference under the
First Amendment." Id. at 678, 422 N.E.2d at 525, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 865. It found the
statute overbroad because it prohibited the distribution of materials produced
outside the state, since the regulation of sexual performances by minors outside of
New York did not come within New York's police power. Id. at 679-80, 422 N.E.2d
at 526, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 866. The court concluded by saying, "We merely hold that
those who present plays, films, and books portraying adolescents cannot be singled
out for punishment simply because they deal with adolescent sex in a realistic but
nonobscene manner." Id. at 681, 422 N.E.2d at 526, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 867.
The court said the statute was also underinclusive because, although it prohib-
ited distribution of films of children engaged in sexual conduct, it did not prohibit
distribution of films in which children had been used in violation of other laws
designed to protect minors. Id.
9. Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist,
and O'Connor, delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice O'Connor filed a concur-
ring opinion. Justice Brennan filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which
Justice Marshall joined. Justice Stevens also filed an opinion concurring in the judg-
ment. Justice Blackmun concurred in the result.
10. The first amendment provides, "Congress shall make no law. . . abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 576 (1978). Justice Cardozo
1983]
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cable against both the state and federal governments.' 2 Although not held
to be an absolute right, 13 speech is said to be fundamental' 4 and any legisla-
tive act which restricts the content of first amendment protected speech car-
ries a presumption of unconstitutionality. 15
Because of the importance of freedom of speech, the Supreme Court
allows legislation impacting speech to be challenged both as applied 16 and
facially. 17 The Court has devised two means of facially challenging regula-
tions restricting speech: overbreadth and vagueness.' 8 It is thought that
these doctrines guard against the possible chilling effect of a facially flawed
has characterized freedom of speech as "the matrix, the indispensable condition, of
nearly every other form of freedom." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
12. The first amendment is applied to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639
(1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943); Minersville School Dist.
v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 593 (1940); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
13. For a discussion of the exceptions to first amendment protection, see note 26
and accompanying text infra.
14. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). The Court stated that
"freedom of speech and of the press. . . are among the fundamental personal rights
and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
from impairment by the States." Id.
15. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 140 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
Justice Rutledge stated,
As the Court has declared repeatedly, [a legislative] judgment does not bear
the same weight and is not entitled to the same presumption of validity,
when the legislation on its face or in specific application restricts the rights
of conscience, expression and assembly protected by the Amendment, as are
given to other regulations having no such tendency. The presumption
rather is against the legislative intrusion into these domains.
Id. (footnote omitted). In speech cases then, the Court presumes the restriction to be
unconstitutional and "the state action may be sustained only if the government can
show that the regulation is a precisely drawn means of serving a compelling state
interest." Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980).
However, Justice Frankfurter has stated, "I deem it a mischievous phrase ['the
preferred position of freedom of speech'], if it carries the thought, which it may subtly
imply, that any law touching communication is infected with presumptive invalid-
ity." Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
16. See generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV.
844, 847-52 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Overbreadth Doctrine].
17. Id See also Note, The Void-for- Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U.
PA. L. REV. 67 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine].
18. Id. The "vagueness" doctrine may apply to a law if "men of common intel-
ligence must necessarily guess at its meaning." Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269
U.S. 385, 391 (1926). In addition, its effect must be to chill first amendment speech.
See Shaman, The First Amendment Rule Against Overbreadth, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 259, 263
(1979). The vagueness concept is sometimes considered a subspecies of overbreadth
because "[iut is only when vague laws chill protected speech-that is, only when their
vagueness amounts to overbreadth-that they abridge first amendment criteria." Id.
at 263. See generally Note, The Void-for- Vagueness Doctrine, supra note 17.
The concepts of overbreadth and vagueness both have been applied to statutes
regulating obscenity. For a discussion of such analysis, see F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF
OBSCENITY 154-68 (1976). For a discussion of overbreadth, see notes 20-25 and ac-
companying text infra.
[Vol. 28: p. 416
3
Jaworski: Constitutional Law - First Amendment - New York Statute Proscribi
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1983
1983] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
statute on first amendment protected speech. 19 The overbreadth doctrine
has been used to invalidate, as facially unconstitutional, statutes that reach
both protected as well as unprotected speech. 20 Significantly, an over-
breadth challenge may be brought by a challenger, who, on the facts, is
engaged in an unprotected activity. 2' The Burger Court, however, has been
reluctant to use the overbreadth rule,22 and, in Broadrick v. Oklahoma,23 lim-
ited the use of strict overbreadth analysis by requiring "substantial over-
breadth" 24 to invalidate statutes not regulating "pure speech."
25
19. See generally Note, The Chilhng Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REV.
808 (1969); Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 344-45 (1967) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150-54 (1959).
20. See, e.g., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974) (invalidating
ordinance making it unlawful for person to use opprobrius language toward a police
official on duty because ordinance not specifically limited to "fighting words"); But-
ler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957) (invalidating state statute making it unlawful to
distribute materials tending to corrupt minors because also applied to sales to adults).
See generally Shaman,supra note 18, at 260. "An overbroad regulation of speech is one
that goes too far by encompassing within its proscription speech that is protected
from governmental regulation by the first amendment. . . Overbroad regulations of
speech are considered to be facially unconstitutional and thus cannot be applied even
to regulate unprotected speech." Id. at 260-61.
21. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965). The Court
noted that "we have consistently allowed attacks on overly broad statutes with no
requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct
could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity." Id.
at 486 (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940); NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963)). See generally Note, The Overbreadth Doctrine, supra note 16;
Shaman, supra note 18.
22. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1186
(10th ed. 1980). While the overbreadth rule was used extensively by the Warren
Court, it has been criticized by the Burger Court. Id. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971), Justice Black, writing for the majority, stated that testing the constitution-
ality of a statute on its face was to some degree "fundamentally at odds with the
function of the federal courts" to resolve concrete cases and controversies. Id. at 52.
See also Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977).
23. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
24. Id. at 615. The statute in Broadrick restricted the political activities of the
state's classified civil servants. Id. at 602. The appellants asserted that the statute
prohibited protected political expression such as the wearing of political buttons or
the displaying of bumper stickers, and thus was overbroad because both protected
and unprotected activities were prohibited. Id. at 609-10. The Court stated that
"particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that the
overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in
relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Id. at 615. The Court found that
the overbreadth in this case was not substantial and declined to invalidate the statute
on its face. It left any overbreadth in the statute to be cured on a case-by-case basis.
Id. at 615-16. The Broadrick decision has been criticized because the criterion of "sub-
stantiality" is vague and produces inconsistent results. See Shaman, supra note 18, at
270.
25. 413 U.S. at 615. The Broadrick Court offered no explanation as to why a
different overbreadth standard should be applied to symbolic speech than to pure
speech. It stated, "[T]he plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial
overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that
its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected be-
4
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Although the Supreme Court has protected freedom of speech
staunchly, it also has found that certain classes of expression, because of their
content, are excepted from first amendment protection.2 6  In 1942, in
Chaphnsky v. New Hampshire,2 7 the Supreme Court addressed the constitu-
tionality of regulating offensive language. In dictum, it categorized obscen-
havior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from 'pure speech' toward conduct
. .Id. See Shaman, supra note 18, at 270-71.
26. The Court has held that the first amendment right of freedom of speech is
not an absolute right. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). See
generally Gard, The Absoluteness of the First Amendment, 58 NEB. L. REv. 1053 (1979);
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245.
Over the years, the Court has created several exceptions to the first amendment,
based on the content of the speech involved. In Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925), the Court upheld a statute punishing seditious utterances. In Chaphnsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), the Court held that "fighting words" also were
excluded from first amendment protection. It defined "fighting words" as words
"which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace." Id. at 572. The Court stated, "There are certain well-defined and nar-
rowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which.have never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and ob-
scene, the profane, the libelous, and insulting or 'fighting words'. . . ." Id. at 571-72.
As indicated by the Court in Chaph'nsky, libel used to be excluded from the protection
of the first amendment. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952). Today, an
exception is made when public officials are the target of libelous statements; unless
those statements are made with "actual malice." See New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). Commercial speech also had been excluded from
protection, but this exclusion ended in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
However, the protection lessens when the commercial speech is deemed "mislead-
ing." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976). For a discussion of regulation of obscenity due to its content, see
notes 29-43 and accompanying text in/ra. See generally Stephan, The First Amendment
and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REV. 203 (1982); Farber, Content Regulation and the
First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEo. L.J. 727 (1980).
In recent years, Justice Stevens has advocated a theory of free speech that would
result in some types of expression being deemed second-class speech on the basis of
their content. He has stated that "the State may legitimately use the content of these
[sexually explicit] materials as the basis for placing them in a different classification."
Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976). Justice Stevens rea-
soned "that society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly differ-
ent, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate .... "
Id. at 70. Justice Stevens reiterated this position in FCC v. Pacific Found., 438 U.S.
726 (1978). His position, however, never has been adopted by the full Court and has
been met with much criticism. See Comment, Content-Based Classiftcations of Protected
Speech: A Less Vital Interest?-Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 1976 UTAH L.
REV. 616; Comment, "Indecent" Language: A New Class of Prohibitable Speech? FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation, 13 U. RICH. L. REV. 297 (1979); Note, Pacifica's Seven Dirty
Words: A Sliding Scale of the First Amendment, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 969.
27. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). In Chaplinsky, the defendant was accused of violating a
state statute proscribing, inter aha, the addressing of others in a public place in offen-
sive and derisive ways that would annoy them. Id. at 569. Chaplinsky distributed
religious literature on a public street and attracted a visibly hostile crowd. Id. at 569-
70. The Court held that punishment for his use of words that were likely to provoke
a retaliatory response and lead to a breach of the peace did not impinge upon first
amendment rights. Id. at 574. For a further discussion of Chaplinsky, see note 26
supra.
[Vol. 28: p. 416
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ity as a class of expression outside first amendment protection.2 8 However, it
was not until Roth v. United States, 29 fifteen years later, that the Court en-
countered a direct challenge to the constitutionality of an obscenity regula-
tion. 30 The Court held that "obscenity is not within the area of
constitutionally protected speech or press" 3 1 and adopted a test for deter-
mining what expression is obscene: "whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards,32 the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." 33 Later, inJacobdhs v. Ohio,
3 4
the Court sought to clarify the standard delineated in Roth,35 and stated that
obscenity was to be judged by national, not local, community standards36
and that, if material had any social importance, it could not be denied first
amendment protection. 37 The remainder of the 1960's produced a plethora
28. 315 U.S. at 571-72.
29. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). In Roth, the Court ruled on the constitutionality of a
federal criminal obscenity statute. Id. at 479. Roth had been convicted under the
statute of mailing obscene circulars, which he had used to solicit sales for his New
York book, photograph, and magazine business. Id. at 480.
30. Id. at 479. Although the Court acknowledged that in Roth it was for the first
time forced to rule on the constitutionality of obscenity regulations, it listed numer-
ous opinions wherein the Court had assumed that obscenity was not protected by the
freedoms of speech and press. 354 U.S. at 481 (citing Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250, 266 (1952); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942); Ex
parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736-37 (1877)).
31. 354 U.S. at 485.
32. Id. at 489. The Supreme Court approved the trial court's jury instructions
which directed the jurors to assess the materials as "exclusive judges of what the
common conscience of the community is." Id. at 490. After Roth, a number of lower
federal courts adopted a localized view of community standards. See, e.g., United
States v. West Coast News Co., 30 F.R.D. 13 (W.D. Mich. 1962); United States v.
Frew, 187 F. Supp. 500, 506 (E.D. Mich. 1960). Cf. Alexander v. United States, 271
F.2d 140, 146 (8th Cir. 1959); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Hendricks, 262 F.2d 392, 397
(9th Cir. 1958).
33. 354 U.S. at 489. The Court specifically rejected a test that had been fol-
lowed by some courts, which was derived from Regina v. Hicklin, 3 L.R.----Q.B. 360
(1868). The Htickh test "allowed material to be judged merely by the effect of an
isolated excerpt upon particularly susceptible persons." 354 U.S. at 488-89. The
Court stated that the Hicklin test "might well encompass material legitimately treat-
ing with sex, and so it must be rejected as unconstitutionally restrictive of the free-
doms of speech and press." Id. at 489.
34. 378 U.S. 184 (1964). InJacobelh's, the manager of a motion picture theatre
was convicted under a state obscenity law of possessing and exhibiting an allegedly
obscene film. Id. at 185-86.
35. Id. at 191. The Court recognized that the Roth test was not perfect, but
continued to adhere to it because it believed that any substitute test "would raise
equally difficult problems." Id.
36. 378 U.S. at 192-93. The Court gleaned its definition of "community" from
a passage by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Kennerly, 209 F. 119, 121
(S.D.N.Y. 1913). See 378 U.S. at 192-93. TheJacobel/is Court stated, "We do not see
how any 'local' definition of the 'community' could properly be employed in de-
lineating the area of expression that is protected by the Federal Constitution." Id. at
193. The Court added, "It is, after all, a national Constitution we are expounding."
Id. at 195.
37. 378 U.S. at 191. The Court stated the test as follows:
1983]
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of Supreme Court cases dealing with obscenity, 38 and an admitted confusion
in the area.39
In 1973, in Miller v. California,4 ° the Court outlined the obscenity stan-
dard that remains in effect today. It held that, in order to pass first amend-
ment muster, state regulation of obscenity must "be limited to works which,
taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest, which portray sexual con-
duct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." 4 1 The Court also ruled
that state regulation of obscenity was permissible only as to works depicting
or describing sexual conduct that was specifically defined by the state ob-
Material dealing with sex in a manner that advocates ideas,. . . or that has
literary or scientific or artistic value or any other form of social importance,
may not be branded as obscenity and denied the constitutional protection.
Nor may the constitutional status of the material be made to turn on a
"weighing" of its social importance against its prurient appeal, for a work
cannot be proscribed unless it is "utterly" without social importance.
Id. (footnote omitted). In a later case, the Court reiterated that works had to be
"utterly without redeeming social value" to be branded obscene and proscribed. See
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
38. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (private possession of ob-
scene material in home protected by constitutional right of privacy); Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (materials not obscene when distributed to adults may
nonetheless be kept from minors because of state's interest in protecting children);
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968) (motion picture licensing ordi-
nance utilizing vague standard of "not suitable for young persons" held to be uncon-
stitutional); Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967) (Court acknowledged
divergence of views among justices as to the proper test for obscenity and simply
reversed the convictions in the case); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966)
(in close cases, evidence of pandering-advertising to appeal to prurient interest-
would be relevant in determining whether the work was legally obscene); Memoirs v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (material must be without any redeeming social
value to be adjudged obscene); Mishkin v. United States, 383 U.S. 502 (1966) (pruri-
ent appeal of materials designed for and disseminated to a deviant sexual group
would be measured in terms of that group and not the "average person").
39. In Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968), Justice Harlan
noted, "[T]he subject of obscenity has produced a variety of views among the mem-
bers of the Court unmatched in any other course of constitutional adjudication." Id.
at 704-05 (Harlan, J., dissenting and concurring) (footnote omitted). Justice Harlan
continued, "The upshot of all this divergence in viewpoint is that anyone who under-
takes to examine the Court's decisions since Roth which have held particular material
obscene or not obscene would find himself in utter bewilderment." Id. at 707
(Harlan, J., dissenting and concurring) (footnote omitted). Justice Harlan pointed
out that, in the 13 obscenity cases decided since Roth, there had been a total of 55
separate opinions among the Justices. Id. at 705 n.1. (Harlan, J., concurring and
dissenting). See Note, Obscenity and the Supreme Court.- Nine Years of Confustion, 19 STAN.
L. REV. 167 (1966); The Supreme Court 1965 Term, 80 HARV. L. REV., 91, 186-94
(1966).
40. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). In Miller, the appellant was convicted of mailing unso-
licited sexually explicit material in violation of a state statute. Id. at 16.
41. Id. at 24. The Miller Court specifically rejected the "utterly without redeem-
ing social value" test of Memoirs v. Massachusetts. Id. at 24-25. For a discussion of
Memoirs, see notes 37 & 38 supra.
[Vol. 28: p. 416
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scenity law.4 2 Moreover, the national community standard ofjacobelh's was
rejected in favor of a local community standard. 43
The Supreme Court has enunciated a particular concern for the protec-
tion of minors in the area of obscenity regulation. 44  In Ginsberg v. New
York, 45 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a state statute prohibiting
the knowing sale to a minor of material defined to be obscene as to the mi-
nors and which, taken as a whole, was harmful to minors.46 The Court
based its decision on the power of states to adjust the Roth definition of ob-
scenity 47 as applied to minors, 48 in order to give parents the support of the
42. 413 U.S. at 24. The Court went on to give some examples of what could be
defined for regulation: "Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate
sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated . . . . Patently offensive repre-
sentations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition
of the genitals." Id. at 25.
43. Id. at 31-33. The Court stated that it was not realistic or constitutionally
sound to require a national standard. Id. at 32. It recognized that people in different
states vary in their tastes and attitudes, and did not want to strangle this diversity by
imposing the uniformity of a national standard. Id. at 33.
44. See notes 44-53 and accompanying text nfra. The Court's concern for mi-
nors extends to other areas as well. In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), the
Court upheld a statute prohibiting the use of a child to distribute literature on the
street, recognizing that the state's power to control the conduct of children is greater
than the scope of its authority over adults. Id. at 170. The Court sought to protect
children from possible difficult situations, emotional excitement, and psychological or
physical injury. Id. at 169-70.
. Recently, in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982), the
Court again acknowledged that the state interest in "safeguarding the physical and
psychological well-being of a minor is a compelling one." Id. at 2621 (footnote omit-
ted). The Supreme Court struck down a state statute providing for exclusion of the
press and general public from the courtroom when minor victims of certain sexual
offenses were testifying. Id. at 2616. The state had advanced two interests to justify
mandatory exclusion during the minor victim's testimony: "[t]he protection of minor
victims of sex crimes from further trauma and embarassment; and the encourage-
ment of such victims to come forward and testify in a truthful and credible manner."
Id. at 2620-21 (footnote omitted). The Court recognized that the state's interest in
protecting minors was compelling but found that a mandatory exclusion rule was not
justified. Id. at 2621. It recommended a case-by-case determination of the necessity
for exclusion, considering such factors as "the minor victim's age, psychological ma-
turity, and understanding, the nature of the crime, the desires of the victim, and the
interests of parents and relatives." Id.
45. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). In Ginsberg, a stationery store owner was convicted of
selling "girlie" magazines to a minor in violation of state law. Id. at 631.
46. Id. at 633.
47. The definition of obscenity at the time of the Ginsberg case was the one delin-
eated in Roth. For the Roth definition of obscenity, see notes 32-33 and accompany-
ing text supra.
48. 390 U.S. at 638. The Court found that the state's power to control the con-
duct of children is clear. Id. (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)).
The state had defined obscenity on the basis of its appeal to the sexual interests of
minors, here defined as those under 17 years of age. Id. Justice Stewart, in a concur-
ring opinion, found the action of the state permissible because "at least in some pre-
cisely delineated areas, a child . . . is not possessed of that full capacity for individual
choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees." Id. at 649-50
(Stewart, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
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law to aid them in the rearing of their children and in order to further the
state's independent interest in protecting the welfare of children and safe-
guarding them from abuse. 49 In FCC v. Pacifta Foundation,5° the Court up-.
held the FCC's punishment of a radio station which broadcast an indecent,
but not obscene, 5 1 comedy monologue, basing its decision in part upon
broadcasting's unique accessibility to children.
52
Against this background, the Ferber Court was faced with the novel issue
of whether a state statute prohibiting the promotion of works that were not
obscene under the Mller standard, but which featured sexual performances
by minors, could withstand constitutional scrutiny. 53 The Court noted that
twenty states, including New York, have statutes prohibiting the distribution
of material depicting children engaged in sexual conduct with no require-
ment that the material be legally obscene.54 It stated that the New York
Court of Appeals had not been unreasonable in concluding that promotion
of such nonobscene adolescent sexual materials could not be proscribed
under the traditional Mller obscenity standard. 55 However, the Court was
49. Id. at 639.
50. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). In Pacifica, a radio station made an afternoon broad-
cast of a satiric monologue by comedian George Carlin which repeatedly used
"words you could not say on the public airwaves" in a variety of colloquialisms. A
father who heard the broadcast while driving with his young son, complained to the
Federal Communications Commission. Id. at 729-30.
51. The statute in question prohibited the utterance of any obscene, indecent, or
profane language by means of radio communication. Id. at 731 n.3 (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 1464 (1976)). The defendant radio station argued that its broadcast was not inde-
cent because of the absence of prurient appeal. Id. at 739. The Court determined.
that prurient appeal was not an element of indecency, although it was an element of
obscenity, and accordingly found the language to be indecent. Id. at 741.
52. Id. at 749. The Court stated that the broadcast media presented special first
amendment problems because of its uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of Amer-
icans and its accessibility to children. Id. at 748-49. The Court said that broadcast
material confronts people in the privacy of their homes, where the individual's right
to be left alone outweighs the first amendment rights of the broadcaster. Id. at 748.
It also said that, in this case, while a "written message might have been incomprehen-
sible to a first grader,. . . [the] broadcast could have enlarged a child's vocabulary in
an instant." Id. at 749. The Court stated that although other forms of offensive ex-
pression could be withheld from children without restricting the source of the mate-
rial, it was necessary to restrict the source of broadcasting because of its unique
accessibility. Id. at 749-50.
53. 102 S. Ct. at 3350.
54. Id. at 3351. For the text of the New York statute, see note 5 supra. The
Court noted that 47 states and the federal government have statutes aimed at the
production of child pornography, half of which do not require that the produced
materials be legally obscene. 102 S. Ct. at 3350. Also, 35 states and the federal gov-
ernment have laws prohibiting the distribution of child pornography. Id. at 3351.
The Court noted that 15 states and the federal government prohibit such dissemina-
tion only if the material is obscene, and 2 states prohibit dissemination only if the
material is obscene as to minors. Id. at n.2. In addition, 12 states prohibit only the
use of minors in the production of the material. Id.
55. 102 S. Ct. at 3352. The Court recognized that the New York Court of Ap-
peals used the Mi'ller guidelines to divide protected from unprotected expression.
However, it noted that this was the first time the Court had examined a child por-
[Vol. 28: p. 416
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persuaded that, for five reasons,56 "the States are entitled to greater leeway
in the regulation of pornographic depictions of children" than in the regula-
tion of other forms of pornography.
5 7
The Court first recognized the state's interest in safeguarding the well-
being of its minors58 and that "[t]he prevention of sexual exploitation and
abuse of children constitutes a government objective of surpassing impor-
tance." 59 It refused to second-guess the legislative findings that the use of
children as subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to their physiologi-
cal, emotional, and mental health.6° The Court found that this legislative
judgment easily passed muster under the first amendment. 6'
Secondly, the Court determined that "[tlhe distribution of photographs
and films depicting sexual activity by juveniles is intrinsically related to the
sexual abuse of children."'62 It dismissed Ferber's contention that the state
should be allowed to prohibit only the distribution of materials deemed ob-
scene under the Miller test. 63 The Court found that, although some states
incorporate the Miller standard in their child pornography laws, the first
amendment does not prohibit states from going further.64 Moreover, the
Court concluded that the Mller test was not "a satisfactory solution to the
nography statute. Id. at 3352-53. For a discussion of the position taken by the New
York Court of Appeals, see note 8 and accompanying text supra. For a statement of
the Miller standard, see notes 41-43 and accompanying text supra.
56. For a discussion of the Court's five reasons, see notes 58-73 and accompany-
ing text itnfra.
57. 102 S. Ct. at 3354. The Court reasoned that although "laws directed at the
dissemination of child pornography run the risk of suppressing protected expression,"
this interest was outweighed by the state's interest in protecting minors. Id. For a
discussion of the state's interest, see notes 58-59 and accompanying text rnfra.
58. 102 S. Ct. at 3354 (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct.
2613 (1982); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629 (1968); Prince v. Massachusettes, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)). For a discussion
of Globe Newspaper, see note 44 supra. For a discussion of Pacifica, see notes 50-52 and
accompanying text supra. For a discussion of Ginsberg, see notes 45-46 and accompa-
nying text supra. For a discussion of Prince, see note 44 supra.
59. 102 S. Ct. at 3355.
60. Id. The Court cited numerous professional articles which agreed with the
legislative findings that participation in sexual performances is harmful to children.
Id. at 3355 n.9.
61. Id. at 3355.
62. Id. The Court found that the materials produced become a permanent rec-
ord of the child's participation which, when circulated, exacerbates the harm to the
child. Id. It also determined that the distribution network must be closed in order to
stop the abuse of children occurring in the actual production of the materials. Id. at
3355-56. The Court accepted the conclusions of 35 state legislatures and Congress
that laws which proscribe production of child pornography are insufficient to control
the nationwide pornography problem because such laws are hard to enforce, and,
therefore, that anti-distribution laws are needed to dry up the market for pornographic
productions. Id. at 3356.
63. Id. at 3357. For a discussion of Mil/er, see notes 40-43 and accompanying
text supra.
64. 102 S. Ct. at 3356. The Court said that "the Miller standard, like all general
definitions of what may be banned as obscene, does not reflect the state's particular
1983]
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child pornography problem." 65
The Court next observed that advertising and sale of pornographic
materials involving children is integrally related to the production of such
materials, conduct which is illegal throughout the country.66 Noting that
the constitutionality of laws prohibiting the employment of children in the
production of pornographic materials67 had never been questioned, 68 the
Court surmised that if the production laws were more enforceable, no child
pornography would be on the market and no ominous first amendment im-
plications would arise.69 The Court also reasoned that few live or photo-
graphic records of sexual performances by children would have any literary,
scientific, or educational value.70 It stated that it was not censoring a partic-
ular literary theme or portrayal but merely the use of children in such
themes.
7 1
and more compelling interest in prosecuting those who promote the sexual exploita-
tion of children." Id.
65. Id. at 3357. The Court reasoned that the prurient interest element of the
Miller test "bears no connection to the issue of whether a child has been physically or
psychologically harmed in the production of the work." Id. at 3356. It also stated
that a work "need not be 'patently offensive' in order to have required the sexual
exploitation of a child for its production." Id. In reference to the "value" element of
the Mdler test, the Court concluded that even works which, taken as a whole, contain
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value "may nevertheless embody the
hardest core of child pornography." Id. at 3357. It cited the Memorandum of As-
semblyman Lasher in support of § 236.15 in which it was stated, "It is irrelevant to
the child [who has been abused] whether or not the material . . .has a literary,
artistic, political, or social value." Id. Finally, the Court found the "contemporary
community standards" element of Mller unsuitable in the child pornography context
because it was "unrealistic to equate a community's toleration for sexually oriented
material with the permissible scope of legislation aimed at protecting children from
sexual exploitation." Id. at n.12.
66. Id. at 3357. The Court discussed the relationship between first amendment
freedoms and criminal activity. Id. It said that speech or writing used as an integral
part of conduct which violates a criminal statute has never been protected by first
amendment constitutional immunity. Id. (citing Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice
Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949)). The Court also cited language in another opinion
which said that any first amendment interest involved in the regulation of advertising
"is altogether absent when the commercial activity is illegal and the restriction on
advertising is incidental to a valid limitation on economic activity." Id. at n.14
(quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 389 (1973)).
67. Id. at n.15. The Court observed that a federal statute makes the use of chil-
dren in the production of pornographic material a federal offense. Id. (citing 18
U.S.C. § 2251 (Supp. III 1979)). The Court noted that this statute and many state
anti-production statutes do not require the materials produced to be legally obscene
in order to impose criminal liability. Id.
68. Id. at 3357.
69. Id.
70. Id. The Court agreed with the trial court that other options were available
to producers if the presence of a child was needed for literary or artistic value, e.g.,
simulation or the use of a young-looking person over the statutory age. Id.
71. Id. at 3357-58. The Court emphasized that the first amendment interest
involved here was limited to the use of children in pornographic materials. Id.
(Vol. 28: p. 416
11
Jaworski: Constitutional Law - First Amendment - New York Statute Proscribi
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1983
1983] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 427
Lastly, the Court stated that classifying child pornography as outside
first amendment protection was not inconsistent with its other decisions lim-
iting the scope of the first amendment. 72 It said that content-based classifi-
cations had been accepted in some instances because, within given
classifications, "the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the ex-
pressive interests, if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudica-
tion is required. ' ' 73 The Court thus concluded that, on balance, the class of
material prohibited by the New York statute so affected the welfare of chil-
dren that any expressive interests involved had to be considered outside of
the protection of the first amendment.
74
The Court next turned to the limits on this new child pornography ex-
ception to the first amendment. 75 The Court warned that the proscribed
conduct must be adequately defined by the applicable state law. 76 It com-
pared the test for child pornography to the obscenity standard of Miller, and
"adjusted" the Miller formulation by eliminating its requirements that the
whole work be considered, that the work appeal to the prurient interest of
the average person, and that the sexual conduct be portrayed in a patently
offensive manner. 77 Lastly, the Court cautioned that its ruling applied only
to visual reproductions of live sexual performances by children, and that
criminal liability could be imposed, as with obscenity, only on the basis of
scienter. 78 The Court then analyzed the New York statute and determined
that it comported.with the above-stated standards.
79
72. Id. at 3358 (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Young v.
American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)). In each case, a class of speech was removed from
first amendment protection due to its content. For a discussion of Pacifua, see notes
50-52 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of Mini Theatres, New York
Tines, and Beauhamais, see note 26 supra. Chapinsky is discussed at notes 26-28 and
accompanying text supra.
73. 102 S. Ct. at 3358.
74. Id. The Court employed a balancing test, weighing the expression pro-
scribed by § 263.15 against the welfare of the children used in the production of the
materials. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. The Court also stated that "the nature of the harm to be combatted
requires that the state offense be limited to works that visually depict sexual conduct
by children below a specified age." Id. (footnote omitted). It recognized that "child"
is defined differently by the states. Id. at n. 17.
77. Id. at 3358. For the exact words of the Court, see note 110 tmfra. For a
discussion of the Miler test, see notes 41-43 and accompanying text supra.
78. 102 S. Ct. at 3358.
79. Id. at 3359. The Court found that New York adequately defined and listed
the sexual conduct proscribed. Id. For a discussion of the statutory definitions, see
note 5 and accompanying text supra. The Court also said that because child pornog-
raphy is outside of first amendment protection, no statute singling out this class for
proscription could be found "underinclusive." Id. The Court reasoned that "child
pornography as defined in § 263.15 is unprotected speech subject to content-based
regulation. Hence, it cannot be underinclusive or unconstitutional for a State to do
precisely that." Id. at n.18. It added that the state also could prohibit the distribu-
12
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Finally, the Court confronted the issue of whether the statute was un-
constitutionally overbroad in that it would "forbid the distribution of mater-
ial with serious literary, scientific, or educational value or material which
does not threaten the harms sought to be combatted by the State."' 0 It
found that the substantial overbreadth doctrine of Broadrick was applicable
because, in Broadrick, the Court had "intimated" that the test "at the very
least" applied to cases involving conduct plus speech.8 1 The Court deter-
mined that the New York statute was not substantially overbroad because
the impermissible applications of the statute, such as the production of medi-
cal or artistic works, would only amount to a small fraction of the materials
within the statute's reach.8 2 It further assumed that the state courts would
not give an expansive construction to the proscribed activity.8 3 The Court,
therefore, upheld the statute against the overbreadth challenge, calling it
"the paradigmatic case of a state statute whose legitimate reach dwarfs its
arguably impermissible applications."
8 4
Justice O'Connor, in a concurring opinion, stressed that under the ma-
jority opinion, New York need not except from its statute material with seri-
ous literary, scientific, or educational value, although the statute might not
be constitutionally applied to such materials.8 5 She noted that such an ex-
ception actually would increase opportunities for content-based
censorship.86
tion of unprotected materials produced outside the state because, among other rea-
sons, it is often difficult to determine where child pornography is produced. Id. at
3359 & n. 19.
80. 102 S. Ct. at 3359. The Court pointed out that the New York Court of
Appeals did not apply the restrictive test of substantial overbreadth enunciated in
Broadrick because it considered § 263.15 to be directed at "pure speech." Id. The
New York court then went on to find the statute fatally overbroad. Id. For a discus-
sion of that court's analysis, see note 8 supra. The Supreme Court then discussed the
prudential reasons for limiting facial attacks on statutes and reviewed its reasoning in
Broadrick. 102 S. Ct. at 3360-61. For a discussion of Broadrick, see notes 23-25 and
accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the overbreadth doctrine, see notes 18-
21 and accompanying text supra.
81. 102 S. Ct. at 3362. The Court did not clarify whether it applied Broadrick
because it considered § 263.15 to deal with conduct plus speech or whether it was
extending Broadrick to cases involving "pure speech." For a discussion of this point,
see notes 111-13 and accompanying text tnfta. For the relevant passage from
Broadrick, see note 25 supra.
82. 102 S. Ct. at 3363.
83. Id. The Court said that any overbreadth which existed in § 263.15 could be
cured through a case-by-case analysis of particular fact situations. Id. (citing
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. at 615-16).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 3364 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor explained that the
harm to the child is the same no matter what value the community places on the
material produced. Id.
86. Id. Justice O'Connor pointed out that the New York statute did not at-
tempt to suppress communication of any particular idea but merely the use of chil-
dren to make certain portrayals realistic. Id. She added, "[Tihe statute attempts to
protect minors from abuse without attempting to restrict the expression of ideas by
those who might use children as live models." Id. She found that a consideration of
[Vol. 28: p. 416
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Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred in the judgment
only.8 7 He believed that application of the New York statute to materials
with serious literary, artistic, scientific, or medical value would violate the
first amendment. 88 He doubted that the amount of such materials was de
minimis, and said that it was "inconceivable how a depiction of a child that
is itself a serious contribution to the world of art or literature or science can
be deemed 'material outside the protection of the First Amendment.' "89
Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment, took a more conservative
approach, advocating the avoidance of an overbreadth analysis, because of
the "marginal" value of the expression at issue. 90
It is submitted that the Ferber decision should be praised because of its
strong stand against child pornography. Unfortunately, in attempting to
deal with a widespread national problem, the Court once again cut back the
scope of the first amendment 9' by creating a content-based class of speech
which will not come under its protection.92
It is submitted that the particular fact situation presented to the Ferber
Court forced it to carve out another exception to the scope of the first
amendment. Because not all child pornography is necessarily obscene, 93 the
Court had to uphold the statute even though it had no obscenity require-
ment in order to provide a ruling which would adequately protect minors.
94
This action by the Court, it is submitted, is consistent with the Court's hold-
materials within the statute's reach that did not threaten the harm identified by the
Court was unnecessary because any overbreadth in the statute was not substantial
enough to warrant facial invalidation. Id.
87. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
88. Id. at 3365 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Brennan noted
that some classes of speech are outside first amendment protection because they have
slight social value and involve a compelling state interest. Id. He said that if a work
represented a serious contribution to some field, it did have social value and the
state's interest in suppression would be less compelling because the assumption of
harm to the child involved would have less force. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 3367-68 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Stevens dis-
agreed with the majority's ruling that child pornography is totally without first
amendment protection but stated that "generally marginal speech does not warrant
the extraordinary protection afforded by the overbreadth doctrine." Id. Justice Ste-
vens admitted that the New York statute reached some protected speech, but advo-
cated a case-by-case adjudication. Id. at 3365-67 (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment). For a discussion of Justice Steven's approach to material of "marginal"
first amendment value, or so-called "second-class" speech, see note 26 supra. In Fer-
ber, Justice Stevens was of the belief that the Court had accepted his theory. 102 S.
Ct. at 3367 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
91. For a discussion of other cutbacks on the scope of the first amendment, see
note 26 supra.
92. See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
93. Judge Jasen of the New York Court of Appeals noted this point. See note
104 infra.
94. Also, if the Court failed to uphold § 263.15, Ferber would have gone with-
out punishment. For the text of the two statutes, see notes 4-5 supra.
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ings in Ginsberg, 9 -' Pacifta,96 and other cases in which the Court balanced
freespeech against the compelling interest in protecting the welfare of chil-
dren.97 In these cases, the interest in protecting children prevailed.
Ferber is the first case dealing with children as the subject of visual ex-
pression. 98 The state legislature and the Court were not concerned with the
pornographic materials themselves, but rather with the minors used to pro-
duce them. 99 In essence, the statute attempts to regulate indirectly the con-
duct involved in the making of child pornography by proscribing the
distribution of these materials. 0 0 It is only because of the unenforceability
of production laws that the end product, a form of speech, becomes a neces-
sary subject of regulation.' 0 ' The question then becomes the appropriate-
ness of creating a new class of unprotected speech to deal with this problem.
It is submitted that the Court came to the correct conclusion when it created
this new unprotected class of speech because, although the right of freedom
of speech is fundamental, the state's interest in protecting minors from sexual
abuse is compelling and unquestionably outweighs first amendment
rights.1 0 2 A statute which contains an obscenity standard, as is evidenced so
clearly by the facts of Ferber,' 0 3 is not stringent enough to guard against the
95. For a discussion of Ginsberg, see notes 45-49 and accompanying text supra.
96. For a discussion of Pacifica, see notes 50-52 and accompanying text supra.
97. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982).
Although the Court in Globe did not uphold the statute in question, it did find that in
some cases minors might need protection in situations involving courtroom testi-
mony. For a discussion of Globe Newspaper, see note 44 supra.
98. Globe Newspapers is the closest to Ferber in that the statute in Globe prohibited
the press from being present in a courtroom where a minor was testifying. For a
discussion of Globe, see note 44 supra. One can stretch this conceptually to say that
the child in Globe was the "subject" of the expression.
99. This type of regulation differs in purpose from obscenity statutes because
obscenity statutes are concerned with the effect of sexually exploitive material upon a
community, whereas § 263.15 is concerned with the effect which the conduct has on
the children involved in the production. For a statement of the legislative intent, see
note 3 supra.
100. For a discussion of laws regulating the production of child pornography,
see note 54 supra.
101. These materials are regulated not because they are pornographic, but be-
cause the pornography "contains" minors. As the Court noted, if, in place of minors,
young-looking non-minors were used to simulate the idea, no first amendment prob-
lem would arise. 102 S. Ct. at 3357.
102. The Court willingly accepted the state's interest as compelling. Id. at 3354.
This seems only logical because in Ginsberg, the Court upheld a statute proscribing
the distribution of nonobscene literature to minors. The state's interest in preventing
exploitation of minors used to make such materials must be at least as compelling as
the interest in preventing them from reading it. For a discussion of Ginsberg, see notes
45-49 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the Court's method of analy-
sis in fundamental rights cases, see note 15 supra.
103. At this point, it is relevant to point out again that Ferber was acquitted on
the two charges under the statute containing an obscenity requirement. Therefore, if
the Court failed to uphold § 263.15, Ferber would have gone without punishment.
For a discussion of the charges against Ferber and their resolution, see notes 3-6 and
accompanying text supra.
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harm involved. 104 As Justice O'Connor pointed out, simply because particu-
lar material does not fall within the technical definition of obscenity in
Miller, it does not follow that the child involved in the production was not
harmed.' 0 5 Also, by not requiring a showing of obscenity, the Court guards
against the differences in morality between various communities.
10 6
Nevertheless, the decision is not beyond criticism. One flaw is the ana-
lytically unsound manner by which the Court arrived at its "test" for child
pornography.10 7 Instead of directly stating the test, it used the Mller stan-
104. As Judge Jasen pointed out in his dissent in the New York Court of Ap-
peals opinion:
[T]he characterization of such material as "pornographic" does not neces-
sarily imply that it is "legally obscene." While it is fair to say that most
obscene material is pornographic, the converse is not necessarily true, for a
given performance's "obscenity" in a legal sense depends upon the stan-
dards of the community in which it finds itself.
52 N.Y.2d 674, 682 n.l., 422 N.E.2d 523, 527 n.1, 439 N.Y.S.2d 863, 867 n.1 (1981)
(Jasen, J., dissenting).
This is in contrast with the majority opinion of the New York Court of Appeals,
which said that "it is important to emphasize that the statute considered in this case
does not deal with child pornography. Those who employ children in obscene plays,
films and books, are still subject to prosecution as are those who sell or promote such
materials." 52 N.Y.2d 674, 681, 422 N.E.2d 523, 526, 439 N.Y.S.2d 863, 866-67
(1981) (citing N.Y. Penal Law §§ 263.05, 263.10). The flaw in the majority's reason-
ing seems to stem from its misconception that all pornography is necessarily obscene.
It is important to note that the New York Court of Appeals was constrained by the
fact that there was no existing exception to the first amendment, except obscenity, on
which it could base its decision. Because the jury failed to find the materials obscene,
the court was faced with the choice of setting the jury's verdict aside as against the
weight of the evidence, further restricting the scope of the first amendment without
Supreme Court precedent on which to rely, or taking the "safe" route by declaring
§ 263.15 unconstitutional. It is admitted that an obscenity standard would "catch"
almost all of child pornography, as the New York Court of Appeals reasoned, but the
fact that not all would be sanctioned makes § 263.15 necessary. The obvious illustra-
tion of this point is that Ferber was found by a jury to be not guilty of promoting an
obscene performance, although the subjects of the films he sold were masturbation by
a young boy and sexual intercourse between a group of boys. Surely, the minors who
performed these acts were harmed despite the fact that a jury from the New York
City community found the films not to be obscene. But because the New York Court
of Appeals limited itself to the traditional obscenity analysis under Mller, harm to
the children involved had to be considered an irrelevant element. For a discussion of
the Midler test, see notes 41-43 and accompanying text supra.
105. 102 S. Ct. at 3364. A child photographed while masturbating, for example,
would seem to suffer the same degree of psychological trauma whether the photo-
graph appeared in a pornographic magazine or a medical textbook-the social value
of the work is irrelevant.
106. Under Miller, the Court rejected theJacobe/hs holding that obscenity was to
be judged by a national community standard. For a discussion of community stan-
dards, see notes 32 & 36 and accompanying text supra. The community standard
approach is not relevant in child pornography since the emphasis is on the child, not
the work. A work which is considered obscene in Ames, Iowa may not be so deemed
in New York City, and yet the child involved has suffered through the same harmful
experience.
107. For the Court's formulation of the "test," see notes 75-78 and accompany-
ing text supra.
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dard' 0 8 for comparison and then "adjusted" Mller by negating each of its
elements to arrive at an unstated standard. In essence, all that remains after
these adjustments is a "test" that requires a visual depiction of sexual con-
duct by children below a specified age with such conduct defined and pro-
hibited by state law.' 0 9
Another weakness in the Court's opinion is its overbreadth analysis." 0
The Court applied the Broadrick "substantial overbreadth" test, but did not
make clear whether Broadrick was applicable because the Court considered
this case to involve conduct plus speech or whether it was extending the use
of the "substantial overbreadth" test"' to situations involving "pure
speech.,"1 1 If the latter is true, the Court is breaking new ground and mak-
ing it even more difficult to mount first amendment facial attacks on regula-
tions affecting speech.
The states that have laws similar to the New York statute now are as-
sured of their constitutionality.' 13 Other states may change their laws to con-
108. For a discussion of the Miller standard, see notes 41-43 and accompanying
text supra.
109. The Court stated that
[t]he test for child pornography is separate from the obscenity standard
enunciated in Miller, but may be compared to it for purpose of clarity. The
Miller formulation is adjusted in the following respects: A trier of fact need
not find that the material appeal to the prurient interest of the average
person; it is not required that sexual conduct portrayed be done so in a
patently offensive manner; and the material at issue need not be considered
as a whole.
102 S. Ct. at 3358.
110. Id. at 3359-63. For a discussion of the Court's analysis, see notes 80-84 and
accompanying text supra.
111. For a discussion of overbreadth and the Broadrick doctrine, see notes 18-25
and accompanying text supra.
112. The Court stated that
Broadrick was a regulation involving restrictions on . . . an area not con-
sidered "pure speech," and thus it was necessary to consider the proper
overbreadth test when a law arguably reaches traditional forms of expres-
sion such as books and films. As we intimated in Broadrick, the requirement
of substantial overbreadth extended "at the very least" to cases involving
conduct plus speech. This case, which poses the question squarely, con-
vinces us that the rationale of Broadrick is sound and should be applied in
the present context involving the harmful employment of children to make
sexually explicit materials for distribution.
102 S. Ct. at 3362. The above quote makes it difficult to determine if the Court
considered this case as one involving conduct and speech and thus, coming squarely
under Broadrick, or if this case involved "pure speech," for which the applicability of
the overbreadth test was left unanswered by Broadrick. The Court could be consider-
ing the employment of children to be "conduct." The ambiguity arises because the
Court, in the same passage, refers to films as "pure speech." Id. It must be noted
that the New York Court of Appeals characterized § 263.15 as dealing with "pure
speech." It said that § 263.15 is "clearly aimed at books, films and other traditional
forms of expression." 52 N.Y.2d 674, 677, 422 N.E.2d 523, 524, 439 N.Y.S.2d 863, 865
(1981) (emphasis added).
113. Nineteen states in addition to New York have laws prohibiting the dissemi-
nation of material depicting children engaged in sexual conduct whether or not the
[Vol. 28: p. 416
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form to the New York standard or attempt to be even more stringent. On a
practical level, it remains to be seen how this decision will affect the thriving
illegal underground'" 4 that produces and distributes child pornography.
Statutes like the one in Ferber have been on the books for a number of
years,11 5 with no reported decline in child pornography. Placing a constitu-
tional imprimatur on these statutes just may force this industry to become
more clandestine rather than diminish in volume. It is unclear now if au-
thorities will prosecute distributors of non-pornographic materials, such as
medical textbooks, which contain visual sexual depictions of minors and how
courts will handle these cases. 1 6 The Court's concern was the welfare of the
children involved, and, although it focused on child pornography, it recog-
nized that any visual sexual depiction of a child may be harmful, whether it
has some serious value or is pornographic. 117 The Ferber decision already has
had direct impact. Fearful of prosecution after the Ferber decision, the pub-
lisher of a picture book used to educate children about sex has ceased distri-
bution of the publication. The work had been adjudged not to be obscene
but contained photographs of minors engaged in sexual conduct.11 In con-
clusion, this case once again makes clear that there exists no absolute right to
free speech 1 9 because that right may be weighed against other compelling
interests and, perhaps, subordinated to them.
Cynthia A. Jaworski"
material is obscene. 102 S. Ct. at 3351 n.2. For a discussion of these and other simi-
lar laws, see note 54 supra.
114. 102 S. Ct. at 3350 n.1.
115. The New York statute was enacted in 1977. States with similar laws have
enactment dates ranging from 1976 to 1982. 102 S. Ct. at 3351, 3351 n.2.
116. The Court assumed that the New York courts would not "widen the possi-
bly invalid reach of the statute" and said that any overbreadth should be cured on a
case-by-case basis. Id. at 3363.
117. Id. at 3357. However, Justice Brennan stated that the Court's assumption
of harm to the child loses force when the depiction is a serious contribution to art or
science. Id. at 3365 (Brennan, J., concurring).
118. Philadelphia Inquirer, Sept. 20, 1982, at 7-A, col. 1. The book is "Show
Me!," published by St. Martin's Press, which was issued first in West Germany in
1974 by a Lutheran Church-sponsored publishing company. The English version
was introduced in 1975 and St. Martin's had defended the book successfully in ob-
scenity cases in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Oklahoma. Id.
119. For a discussion of the nature of freedom of speech, see notes 11-15 and
accompanying text supra.
1983]
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